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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ILLINOIS v. LANCE GATES ET ux. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ILLINOIS 
No. 81--430. Decided January , 1982 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
I dissent for the reason that the Illinois Supreme Court 
clearly misapplies well settled law that a detailed tip from an 
a11onymot1s informant. which is subsequently corroborated 
by the police. presents sufficient probable cause to support a 
sea1 rch warrant. Draper r v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959). 
The Bloomingdale, Illinois police department received an 
anonymous letter giving respondents' address and stating 
that they made their living selling drugs. The letter con-
tained a detailed description of respondent method of opera-
tion: that respondent Susan Gates would drive her car to 
Florida where it would be loaded with drugs; that respondent 
Lance Gates would fly to Florida and drive the car back; that 
respondent Susan Gates would then return by airplane. The 
letter stated that a drug transaction would occur on May 3d. 
Finally, the letter stated that respondents had over $100,000 
in drugs in their basement. 
The police confirmed, through a confidential informant, 
that the address in the letter was correct. Respondent 
Lance Gates made a reservation and flew to Florida on May 
5th. He went to a motel room registered to his wife and 
later left in an automobile with tags registered in his QDPH
although for another automobile. After observing this de-
tailed corroboration of the anonvmous OHWWHU the Blooming-
dale police obtained a warrant to searcl1 respondents home 
and the FDUthat they were tlsing in Florida. Whe11 respond-
ents DUULYHG back in Illi110is by car on May 7 h the police 
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VHDUFKHGthe trunk of the car and found 350 pounds of mari-
Juana. A search of the house revealed marijuana weapons 
and drug paraphernalia. ' ' 
. The DFWLYLWLHV of. UHVSRQGHQWVcorresponded almost pre-
cisely with the predictive statements contained in the letter 
making this an a fortiori case under Draper v. United States: 
358 U. S. 307 (1959). Despite this strong corroboration, the 
Illinois courts suppressed the evidence obtained from the 
search warrants. Applying the two-pronged test of Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), the Illinois Supreme Court 
concluded that the anonymous letter failed either to state the 
basis of the informant's knowledge or to provide sufficient in-
formation to evaluate the truthfulness of the informant.* 
The Illinois court found the substantial corroboration insuffi-
cient to cure these defects because it failed to establish that 
the informant based the tip on personal knowledge. The Illi-
nois Court-misapplying Draper-also concluded that great 
detail in the anonymous tip is not, alone, sufficient to estab-
lish the veracity of the informant. Finally, the Court ob-
served that the corroborating evidence was of "clearly inno-
cent'' activity. 
In Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), this 
Court found probable cause when a previously-reliable infor-
mant supplied information describing the defendant's cloth-
ing and physical appearance and stating that the defendant 
would be at a train at a certain time as part of a drug transac-
tion. The police arrested and searched defendant after the 
information from the informant was corroborated by the per-
sonal observation of the police. The activity involved in 
Draper, like the activity in this case, was not FULPLQDOwhen 
viewed in isolation. When Draper's activity was viewed in 
*The Illinois Supreme Court cited provisions from both the federal and 
stater constitutions. It is readily apparent from the decision, however, 
that the Illinois Supreme Court was relying on federal constitutional 
grounds to justify its holding. State Tax Comm'n v. Va·n Cott, 306 U. S. 
511, 514 (1939) (state and federal grounds so interwoven that it is impossi-
ble to conclude that the judgment rests on an independent interpretation of 
state law). 
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light of the informant's information, however, it t(Jok on an 
"aura of VXVSLFLRQsufficient to justify a finding of probable 
cause. 6SLQHOOLv. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 418 
In Spinelli, supra, an affidavit in support of a search ZDr-
rant contained information that a "confidential reliable in-
formant'' had stated that a bookkeeping operation was being 
maintained at a certain address. The police also observed 
activities consistent with a bookkeeping orJeration, but 'Nhich 
were in themselves innocent. In holding that the inform-
ant's information was not sufficient to establish probable 
cause, the Court noted that "it is especially important that 
the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient 
detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on
something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in 
the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individ-
ual's general reputation." 393 U. S., at 416 (emphasis 
added). In this case, as in Draper, the judicial officer issuing 
the warrant could resonably infer from the detailed informa-
tion, \vhich was provided by the informant and subsequently 
corroborated by the police, that the informant was indeed 
trust\vorthy and had obtained his information in a "reliable 
way." Spinelli, 393 U.S., at 417. Verification of reliability 
of both the information and the informant was the purpose of 
the two-pronged Aguilar rule. Draper and Spinelli estab-
lish that this verification may come from the police corrobora-
tion of the detailed tip of an anonymou informant. 
In light of the establi hed guideline of Draper and 
Spinelli, I would grant the petition for certiorari and um-
marily reverse the holding of the Illinoi upreme Court. 
